

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

Herbert S. Levine
Chairman, Board of Trustees
Vladimir I. Toumanoff
Executive Director

Suite 304
1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 387-0168

December 9, 1981


Mr. Henry Rowen
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Harry:

At our November 5 meeting on the Emigre Survey Project you asked for a management plan and a production schedule, and I promised to have them to you before the December 16th meeting with Professor Millar. The plan and the schedule are included in the materials that have been distributed by Paul Cook and should be in your hands by now. Specifically, they are contained in the draft Final Report to the National Council on Contract 626-1, which is among the materials Paul Cook sent you. Also in that draft Final Report is a more comprehensive description than you have had before of the subject matter of the project.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Vladimir Toumanoff

cc: Dr. Andrew Marshall

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Vladimir I. Toumanoff; Donald W. Treadgold; Vladimir G. Trembl; Laura D'Andrea Tyson

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Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 387-0168

December 2, 1981

Dr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
OSD, 3A-930
Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20305

Mr. Henry S. Rowen
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505


Dear Andy and Harry:

Thanks for your welcome letter of November 25th. It is a great help to get to specifics and away from general apprehensions that the Millar project may not be as responsive on key issues as we hope. It is also something of a relief, because I know already that most of the topics you list are, in fact, thoroughly covered.

I have sent copies of your letter to Jim Millar and to the Trustees concerned (Campbell, Kassof, and Korbonski), and I expect you will get a full response at the meeting December 16th, which should also serve to start a real exchange on substance. I haven't spoken with you or the others about it, but my own view is that informal conversations on substance between Government and academic specialists over the duration of the project would be as valuable to both as the final written reports, and could be arranged not to be onerous for either.

I am also sending copies of this exchange of correspondence to Paul Cook so that he may be fully informed.

Cordially,



Vladimir I. Toumanoff

cc: Paul Cook
Robert Campbell
Allen Kassof
Andrzej Korbonski

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Harry Rowen
RLOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301NFAC ~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

25 November 1981

Dr. Vladimir I. Toumanoff
National Council for Soviet
and East European Research
Suite 304
1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Vlad:

As a follow-up to the recent meeting between the Government and the National Council Representatives on the Millar Project, here are some suggestions as to areas and questions that we think are of special interest. In making the following suggestions we have taken account of what the Millar Project can do given the data it will be based upon the nature of its research activity. In that connection we are of the view that the Millar Project cannot effectively address immediate and short term issues and questions which are likely to be less relevant by the time results are available. We are also aware that most of the emigres have been out of the Soviet Union for several years now.

What then are the areas that strike us as being of substantial interest and which the Millar Project might help us with? Our list is as follows:

-- Soviet data indicates a decline in productivity. Can we understand more about the causes of this decline? Above all are they structural or the result of long term trends that will be difficult to reverse? Do the people that we can talk to have awareness that productivity has been declining? Are there noticeable trends in the effort that workers make while at their official jobs? Is there increasing absenteeism? Are there psychological or mood changes in the population that make people's jobs a less central part of their life? If there have been some shifts, what are people's attention shifting to? Where are their energies going if not to their jobs or to training for future success in their jobs? How do these issues relate to the second economy and unofficial jobs?

-- There are some indicators of difficulties or stress within Soviet society. Examples are the increasing death rate of selected groups, leading to a declining life expectancy, especially for males. Do these stresses within the society, caused perhaps by declining standards of living, impact on the productivity of workers on their jobs. Are people aware of any increased stress or systematic decline in the standard of living in the Soviet Union? If so, what measures, what aspects are people most aware of? What they give the most weight

to in making these judgments? Are they aware of the declining life expectancies, increased death rates at birth, etc. What other measures do they pay attention to?

-- It is often assumed that there is some "breaking point" threshold below which a real or perceived decline in the standard of living could lead to large-scale popular disorders. Is this likely to be the case? Are there certain contingencies (e.g., severe bread shortages, no vodka) that would signal such a threshold? Or, will Soviet (and especially Russian) citizens tolerate virtually "anything"?

-- Ultimately, if the performance of the Soviet economy is to be improved there must be some sort of economic reform. What would be the likely responses of different groups in the population to: (1) price increases; (2) large-scale labor release; (3) greater wage differentiation; (4) more managerial autonomy; (5) the introduction of market elements into the system?

-- How do perceptions of corruption affect people's thinking -- if at all -- about the Soviet system as a whole?

-- Have there been any subtle changes over time in the operation of political institutions and ideological controls which impact upon the daily lives of Soviet citizens?


-- Has there been any subterranean shift in popular attitudes toward the Soviet leadership, political institutions or ideological controls?

-- Are ethnic tensions increasing in Soviet society? If so, in what form? Why?

-- Are Soviet citizens better informed today than in the past about foreign policy matters? With respect to which aspects of the leadership's behavior in foreign affairs is there greatest latent popular disaffection (e.g., aid to Eastern Europe or the Third World)?

We hope that these broad questions will be used in guiding some portions of the Millar effort. These seem to us to be the kind of issues that will be around for quite a while; indeed likely to increase in importance and saliency in the coming years.

Sincerely,



HENRY S. ROWEN
Chairman
National Intelligence Council


ANDREW W. MARSHALL